Como se trata de material protegido por copyright, ou por direitos exclusivos aos assinantes do serviço, não posso revelar nem a totalidade da análise, nem os dados editoriais do material abaixo, do qual eu selecionei apenas alguns trechos para que as pessoas tenham uma ideia mais fiável do que se anda dizendo sobre o Brasil no exterior.
Sei, por conhecimento direto, que fundos de investimento baseados em Nova York já tomaram a decisão de "desembarcar" do Brasil.
O que significa isto?
Significa vender o que for possível vender com um mínimo de perdas, retirar o dinheiro, enquanto o câmbio ainda não se deteriorou de vez, e não mais investir por aqui pelos próximos cinco anos, pelo menos.
É preciso saber que, à diferença dos verdadeiros especuladores de curto prazo, que atuam sobre ganhos de seis meses, fundos de investimento, que possuem uma carteira de vários bilhões de dólares -- tipicamente, um desses fundos médios, possue uma carteira de 5 a 10 bilhões de dólares apenas para mercados emergentes -- geralmente fazem planejamento de médio prazo (de 5 a 15 anos), com uma expectativa de ganhos de dois dígitos, pelo menos, do contrário não vale a pena correr o risco.
Dois dígitos significa entre 15 e 25% de valorização no ano, e isso pode ser ações, debêntures de empresas privadas, equity participations, e até títulos do governo com taxas atrativas, mas basicamente investimentos reais (tipo infraestrutura, empresas prometedoras, algumas até estatais).
Pois bem, o que acontece quando as coisas chegam ao ponto em que chegaram no Brasil, sem qualquer previsão de ganhos nos próximos dois anos?
Os fundos simplesmente fazem bagagem e vão embora, e deixam o país em questão até dois anos depois que as coisas estiverem estabilizadas e os negócios restabelecidos na perspectiva do crescimento. Ora, isso é impossível de ocorrer no momento.
É por isso que eu disse, no começo, que pode e deve ficar pior, como aliás é confirmado por este report, de que transcrevo estes trechos agora.
O analista que escreveu o relatório diz que se trata da PRIMEIRA VEZ, desde 1929-1931, que o Brasil enfrenta dois anos seguidos de recessão.
19 de março de 2015
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
Paulo Roberto de Almeida
How bad can Brazil get? Much, much worse.
A visit last week for a round of discussions with investors, government officials and scholars confirmed an extraordinary deterioration in Latin America’s biggest economy in just the last six months, one that is nowhere close to playing out.
(...)
The proximate cause was the collapse in the oil price, which suddenly rendered the US$130bn debt of state-owned oil behemoth Petrobras an untenable burden. Unluckily this coincided with the culmination of a scandal in which Petrobras executives and public officials stand accused of collecting millions of dollars in bribes from construction companies in exchange for contracts.
(...)
Petrobras’s implosion is also an economic disaster. The firm accounts for nearly 10% of the nation’s fixed investment, so its recently announced plans to slash capex by 30% this year will lop off 3% from total national capital spending. Its vast supplier relationships are an important part of the economic fabric, and these suppliers have been badly hurt by the firm’s inability to pay its bills: its payment terms have quadrupled from 28 days two years ago to 120 days today.
(...)
Brazil’s resource woes do not stop with Petrobras. Vale, the big mining firm that depends heavily on iron ore exports to China, is struggling because of the end of China’s construction boom, which has driven the iron ore price from an average of US$134 a ton in 2013 to around US$60 today.
(...)
The combined effect of all these negative economic factors, the necessary but painful fiscal tightening, and the lack of any other plausible sources of near-term growth, is that Brazil’s economy will likely contract by -1-2% this year, with another somewhat smaller drop in 2016. This would be the first time since 1929-30 that Brazil’s economy has shrunk for two consecutive years. On top of that, inflation is accelerating, and at 7.7% is at its highest rate since 2005.
(...)
Markets have already reacted, pushing the real down to 3 against the dollar, its lowest rate in a decade and nearly a third below its peak. The Bovespa index is 19% off its August high. But deeper selloffs are in store. Many major Brazilian institutions sold their domestic equity positions months ago, and private wealth is streaming out of the country. A common theme in our talks with investors was perplexity that foreign money continues to flow into Brazilian stocks. Once foreign investors wise up, equity prices and the real will both tumble much further.
(...)
Policy is unlikely to provide much help. Dilma is weak, politically isolated and committed to the PT’s strategy of buying votes through welfare populism. She is terrified of a credit-rating downgrade that would reduce Brazil’s debt to junk status, which is why she authorized Levy to tighten up the budget. Even if Levy succeeds in staving off a downgrade, the government has no strategy for re-igniting growth. And there is no guarantee that Levy will succeed: his austerity measures must pass a Congress that is now paralyzed by the Petrobras scandal, and whose leaders have no incentive to cut hard fiscal deals with a half-hearted Dilma. Levy himself has no political clout and will find it hard to act without strong backing from his boss. There are low but rising odds that he could resign by the end of the year.
(...)
The only good news is that most people seem to think the Petrobras scandal marks a turning point in the treatment of corruption: in a few years Brazil will emerge with a significantly cleaner political system. And the economy is large and diversified enough that it can weather a period of contraction without a severe decline in absolute living standards. For the next year or two, though, there is little reason to expect anything other than more pain.
[end]
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